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ABSTRACT 
In-service failures of process plant gas turbines can have major 
economic consequences in terms of repairs and downtime. 
Following such an incident, steps need to be taken to avoid a 
recurrence. This is best accomplished through a formal analysis of 
the failure, and this paper discusses the key aspects of the 
procedure. Several case histories pertaining to hot section failures 
on mechanical drive and generator drive gas turbines in a variety of 
process plant applications are also presented. These provide a 
representative cross-section of the different failure mechanisms 
and range of causes that can be encountered as well as 
demonstrating the multidisciplinary approaches used to investigate 
the incidents. Lessons learned are highlighted. 
INTRODUCTION 
Gas turbines are to be found in mechanical drive and electric 
generator drive service in refinery, chemical, oil and gas facilities, 
and a wide range of other process plants. Despite the best efforts of 
the turbine designers, major in-service failures occasionally occur. 
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Following such an incident, the plant operator has three main 
priorities: 
• Current operation 
• Return to service 
• Avoid recurrence 
First of all, operational changes will have to be made to 
accommodate the equipment that has become unavailable. 
Secondly, manpower and hardware must be organized to 
dismantle, repair, and return the turbine to service. The third, and 
crucial priority, is to take steps that will avoid a similar occurrence 
in the future. This is best accomplished through a rigorous analysis 
of the incident. In such an analysis, the mechanism of failure is 
identified, root causes and contributing factors determined, and 
then appropriate solutions are developed. Failure analysis is the 
primary concern of this paper. 
While recognizing that failures can and do occur elsewhere on 
the engine, the hot section is of specific interest here. The majority 
of gas turbine failures occur in this part of the machine where the 
hot section components (i.e., combustor liners, transition pieces, 
vanes (nozzles), and blades (buckets)) must operate at elevated 
temperatures with high stresses in a hostile environment (Boyce, 
1982; Meher-Homji and Gabriles, 1998). 
'TYpically, analysis of industrial gas turbine hot section failures 
demands a combined metallurgical-mechanical engineering 
approach to extract the maximum information from a failure event. 
This is reviewed in the paper. Deductive techniques such as fault 
tree analysis, can be useful in helping to understand the cause-and­
effect relationships in the more complex incidents, and some 
discussion of this is also included. 
A number of case histories of hot section failures on mechanical 
drive and generator drive gas turbines in process plant applications 
are presented. These serve as examples of the different failure 
modes, mechanisms, and causes that can be encountered as well as 
demonstrating the methods by which these were identified. 
Lessons learned are highlighted and, in addition to the strictly 
technical causes, shortcomings in the management of the 
equipment that allowed the conditions for failure to develop are 
discussed. In this respect, the root causes of many turbine failures 
can be traced to choices made, decisions taken, or events that 
occurred some considerable period of time, often years, prior to the 
actual incident. 
Turbine failures are unexpected, unwanted, and the economic 
consequences in terms of downtime and repairs can be 
considerable. Nevertheless, such incidents can be used 
constructively to improve the design of the equipment and how it 
is operated and maintained. Successful failure avoidance is 
achieved through an experienced team using proven methods to 
properly analyze the causal factors. The recommended solutions 
must then be committed to and implemented correctly. 
TURBINE HOT SECTION 
DEGRADATION MECHANISMS 
Turbine hot section components degrade during service (Daleo 
and Boone, 1996; Bernstein, 1998). This degradation occurs in 
different ways for different modes of turbine operation; creep, 
oxidation and hot corrosion are, typically, the main life limiting 
factors in continuous duty machines, while thermal-mechanical 
fatigue is the factor of most concern in machines used in 
intermittent service or peaking operation. Other damage 
mechanisms such as high cycle fatigue, foreign object damage 
(FOD), erosion, and wear can also be of significance. Often, the 
�ituation is quite complex with several damage mechanisms acting 
in combination. A brief description of each of the main 
mechanisms is provided in APPENDIX A of the paper. 
The forms of hot section component degradation mentioned 
above tend to be gradual, time dependent processes that can 
usually be effectively managed through programs of inspection and 
maintenance. However, if the degradation is somehow 
unanticipated, is more than expected, or is allowed to go too far, 
component failure can result. 
The components in the hot section of a gas turbine can also be 
subject to damage in more acute (and often dramatic) ways. The 
causes are typically associated with variability in fuel 
composition/heat value and with fuel system/nozzle faults. Such 
occurrences can give rise to combustion upsets in which both 
combustor and turbine sections are exposed to abnormally high or 
uneven gas temperatures and, in extreme cases, to fires and 
explosions. 
Primary and Secondary Failures 
In understanding failure sequences in turbines (and other turbo­
machinery), it is necessary to consider the primary (or initiating) 
failure and the secondary (or consequential) failures/damage. The 
potential exists for widespread secondary damage when the 
primary failure, notably involving the fracture of a rotating blade, 
results in the release of pieces into the gas path. Depending on the 
location at which this occurs, the outcome can be damage to a few 
neighboring components or catastrophic failure of the entire 
turbine section, commonly referred to as a turbine "wreck." 
Some circumstances have been encountered where additional 
secondary damage occurred after the turbine operator, unaware of 
the internal damage just caused to the machine, attempted one or 
even several restarts resulting in "churning" of the loose parts and 
debris. 
The implications of secondary damage/failure are twofold. First, 
the greater the extent of the damage, the higher the repair costs and 
longer the downtime will be. From the point of view of the failure 
analysis, the site of the primary or originating failure may have 
become smeared (plastically deformed), broken up, or even 
destroyed completely. This can significantly complicate the task of 
the failure investigators, increasing the effort required to sort and 
examine components and pieces to locate, and distinguish those 
features existing at the start of the failure sequence from damage 
inflicted during subsequent events. In some circumstances though, 
data pertaining to secondary damage can be usefully extrapolated 
back to provide clues as to the location/nature of the primary 
failure. 
Ideally, we would like to find evidence that positively identifies 
a particular component as being the one that failed first. 
Subsequent efforts could then be focused on understanding exactly 
how and why this component failed. However, where such an 
identification cannot be made due to the severity of the secondary 
damage, the next best outcome is to find clues indicating prior 
cracking, distress, or some other deficiency across a number of the 
components that could have lead to a failure consistent with that 
observed. 
Figures 1 and 2 contrast the impact damage environment in a 
large, utility-type gas turbine and a smaller, mechanical drive 
turbine, respectively, resulting from the failure of a rotating blade. 
Despite the catastrophic airfoil damage on all four rows of blades 
shown in Figure 1, it was evident that the failure originated in the 
first row and, moreover, the particular blade involved was readily 
identifiable due to its different fracture surface location (in the 
root section), pattern, and coloration. The mechanism of the 
primary failure was subsequently identified as being high cycle 
fatigue related. In the mechanical drive turbine, Figure 2, all the 
hollow-cored bucket airfoils on the single-stage compressor 
turbine were fractured very similarly as a result of the impact 
cascade. Despite careful examination of all the buckets in the set, 
the one on which the initial failure and breaking out of a piece of 
airfoil occurred could not be positively identified. Nevertheless, a 
probable mechanism and cause for the primary failure was 
successfully determined (as will be seen later in the case history 
for this incident). 
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Figure 1. Damage to All Four Rows of Blades in Large, Generator 
Drive Gas Turbine. (The fracture surface (in the root section) of 
this particular blade is shown in the lower photograph.) 
Figure 2. Damage to Hollow-Cored First Stage Turbine Buckets in 
a Mechanical Drive Gas Turbine. 
FAILURE INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS 
Objectives 
The goal of a failure analysis on a gas turbine is basically the 
same as it would (or should) be for any critical process machinery: 
avoid a recurrence. This means not only avoiding the particular 
failure experienced, but avoiding this kind of failure (Witherell, 
1994). Accordingly, there may be implications beyond the incident 
machine. If there is other similar equipment at the plant or within 
the organization, then these should also be considered in the post­
failure strategy. 
It is insufficient to identify solely the metallurgical mechanism 
of failure (creep, fatigue, etc.); the mechanical/operational cause(s) 
and contributing factors must also be determined. Then, specific 
solutions or steps, tied to design, operation, inspection, overhaul, 
maintenance, purchasing, or related practices under our control, 
can be identified that would address the causal elements. 
Organization 
Experience has emphasized the value of a multidisciplinary 
approach to conducting failure analyses in which a team of 
unbiased personnel working independently of outside influences 
are given adequate time and resources to conduct the necessary 
investigatory tasks. 
Analysis of failures of gas turbine hot section components 
demands a fairly specialized background. Specifically, an 
understanding of the metallurgy and behavior of superalloy 
materials and associated protective coatings, coupled with an 
appreciation of the mechanical and thermal design characteristics 
of stationary and rotating turbine components. Combining 
specialist expertise and resources in these areas with the turbine 
user's specific knowledge of plant and equipment operational char­
acteristics, inspection, and overhaul practices, as well as the 
incident itself, will generally represent the best approach by which 
a complex hot section failure can be analyzed (for example, 
Lowden and Liburdi, 1985). 
Strictly speaking, the followup to a failure incident comprises 
"investigation" and "analysis" phases (Witherell, 1994). The 
investigation typically involves the initial survey and characteriza­
tion of the problem in the field, documenting conditions and 
observations, and the identification and gathering of failed parts, 
nonfailed parts, and other potentially relevant data. The analysis 
phase, on the other hand, involves extracting further information 
concerning the failure via the laboratory analysis of the selected 
parts, modeling and calculation work, cause-and-effect charting, 
etc., to allow a full understanding to be gained of what occurred 
and why. All the information is organized and reviewed, 
conclusions drawn and appropriate corrective measures developed 
from these. 
Preserving the Evidence 
Gathering and preserving evidence after a failure are crucial 
steps, and time is of the essence. The first priorities should be with 
those data that could be considered "volatile" or time sensitive in 
the sense that these could readily become discarded, rearranged, or 
forgotten about. Accordingly, it is important to commence the 
onsite phase of the failure investigation as soon as practical after 
the incident to minimize the opportunities for evidence degradation 
and loss. Relevant data will be people, parts, and paperwork 
related, i.e., witness recollections, failed and intact components, 
control system histories, instrument charts, etc. 
Wherever possible, the failure investigators should have the 
opportunity to appreciate the "bigger picture" by reviewing the 
overall appearance of the wrecked turbine and relative positions of 
the components, as well as just individual parts or pieces. The 
taking of a video or photographic record of the opening up and 
dismantling of the turbine represents an extremely valuable 
method of preserving the as found condition of the equipment for 
ongoing review. Ideally, the failure analysis should dictate when 
equipment dismantling and repairs can occur. More realistically, 
however, the post-failure priorities of getting the failed machinery 
back online and preserving evidence must be balanced, 
recognizing that repair efforts will likely compromise information. 
Despite the best efforts of turbine users to gather and preserve 
evidence after a failure, it is not uncommon for the material and 
other data actually available for analysis to be significantly less 
than the ideal. 
Fault Tree Analysis 
A systematic approach to failure analysis, based on pursuing 
cause-and-effect relationships, significantly enhances the chances 
that the root (primary) causes and important contributory factors 
will all be successfully identified (Bloch and Geitner, 1997; 
Witherell, 1994). Preparation of a causation diagram, in which the 
possible failure sequences are logically represented, can be 
extremely useful not only as an aid during the investigation itself, 
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but in helping to communicate the findings to others. This means 
convincing plant management, insurers, and other concerned 
parties that all potential causes have been considered, the 
conclusions reached are plausible and consistent with actual 
experience, and the recommended actions will address the problem 
areas. 
Causation diagrams based on the deductive, fault tree method 
have been found to be particularly useful (for example, Perez, 
1995). In a fault tree, the primary event, problem or damage 
condition under consideration is progressively traced "downward" 
through all the possible cause-and-effect chains. The diagram is 
put together based on consideration of the specific design and 
operating circumstances of the unit, known failure mechanisms for 
gas turbine components, and the experience base of the 
investigators concerning previous failures and problems. 
Since fault trees can be quite extensive, only portions can be 
included in this paper. Parts of two representative diagrams are 
shown. The diagram, shown in Figure 3, was actually developed 
following another fault tree put together by the plant investigation 
team subsequent to a catastrophic turbine failure (Case History B). 
This first fault tree had been used to help systematically eliminate 
turbine operational factors, such as instrumentation and control 
system faults, as causal factors in the failure, thereby narrowing 
down the range of possibilities to mechanical degradation of 
components. These issues were then specifically addressed in the 
second phase of the investigation for which the fault tree here was 
created. Figure 3 shows an intermediate "branch" of the tree 
concerned with failure by creep rupture. Other portions of the 
diagram considered high cycle fatigue, foreign object damage, etc. 
c:- 'OR' GATE 
<;,.TRANSFER 
Figure 3. Intermediate Branch of Fault Tree Diagram Used to 
Analyze the Failure Described in Case History B. 
Figure 4 shows the "top" part of another fault tree. This diagram, 
prepared for Case History D, explored the potential causes of severe 
overheating damage to a row of cooled turbine nozzle vanes. Cause­
and-effect chains were developed for exposure of the vanes to 
excessively high gas temperatures and for failures of the cooling on 
the vane that comprised impingement, convection, and film features. 
'OR' GATE 
TRANSFER 
Figure 4. Top Portion of Fault Tree Diagram Used to Analyze the 
Overheating Failure of Cooled Vanes Described in Case History D. 
In order that the causation diagram is not overly wide-ranging, it 
is most useful to prepare it after a preliminary assessment of the 
failure has been made. For example, it is usually evident early on 
whether the primary damage observed was the result of an 
overheating/burning mechanism or was "mechanical" in nature. If 
the data are not consistent with the former, then this avenue need 
not be pursued in the fault tree diagram. Similarly, little or no 
cause-and-effect analysis should be necessary on the secondary 
damage. Should new information be uncovered later on, however, 
the fault tree can always be developed further. 
Use is made of the fault tree diagram in the following manner. 
Branches of the tree not supported by the factual information arising 
out of the metallurgical, mechanical engineering, and other analysis 
activities are eliminated from active consideration. The process of 
narrowing down the possible cause-and-effect chains continues 
until a most probable scenario for the failure is formulated. 
FAILURE ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES 
The kinds of examinations conducted during a failure analysis 
will vary considerably depending on the nature of the failure, 
components and materials involved, and other factors. No two 
failures are exactly alike. Nevertheless, typical activities in gas 
turbine failure analyses can be identified and these are highlighted 
below. 
Metallurgical Analysis 
Metallurgical analysis of the failed components, nonfailed 
components, and other material as necessary, is central to 
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machinery failure analysis. The following metallurgical activities 
are typically conducted for turbine hot section incidents: 
• Visual inspection 
• Nondestructive examination 
• Chemical analysis of alloy 
• Analysis of deposits on gas path surfaces 
• Fractographic analysis of fracture surfaces 
• Analysis of coated surfaces 
• Metallographic analysis 
• Mechanical properties testing 
The visual inspection and then nondestructive examination (to 
find hidden and secondary cracking, etc.) are used to identify those 
components that have features worthy of further and more indepth 
metallurgical evaluation. Typically, the nondestructive 
examinations will utilize a high sensitivity fluorescent penetrant 
technique, though other specialized methods such as eddy current 
and radiography might be employed depending on the situation. 
As part of the visual inspection, the identification information 
provided on each component (serial number, material code, part 
number, manufacturer logo, etc.) should be noted. This is not only 
necessary for tracking purposes but, in conjunction with 
purchasing, installation, and other records, will help to confirm the 
origins of the components. This information can be especially 
relevant when the parts in question were replacements. 
Fractographic and metallographic evaluations involve the use of 
low power stereoscopic imaging and optical and scanning electron 
microscopy. Material mechanical properties are usually 
determined using tensile, creep, and impact tests. Chemical 
analysis is typically performed using wet chemical, energy­
dispersive X-ray, and X-ray diffraction techniques. 
Estimates of component metal operating temperatures often 
represent very valuable pieces of data in the investigation of a hot 
section failure and can be derived from metallurgical analysis of 
alloy and coating microstructures (Ellison, et al., 1998). 
Mechanical Analysis 
Mechanical analysis can represent an important aspect of failure 
analysis by evaluating the design of the component under 
consideration for susceptibility to failure and assisting in the 
interpretation of the metallurgical findings. This involves 
performing calculations to determine stress patterns, temperature 
distributions, or vibrational response as pertinent to the situation. 
Typically, finite element methods are used, though standard 
formula can be useful. The required dimensional information is 
retrieved from intact components while performance data may be 
obtained from published sources and actual operating records. 
Calculated results can be correlated with the actual observations 
pertaining to the location and mode of damage or failure on the 
component. 
CASE HISTORIES 
The following five case histories represent a cross-section of 
turbine hot section failures from the authors' experience. 
The first two cases, A and B, involved the same basic model of 
widely used, heavy duty, 14,600 hp rated, mechanical drive gas 
turbine. The same components (single-stage compressor turbine 
rotating buckets) failed in a similar manner. However, the analyses 
showed that the mechanisms of the primary failure were actually 
different, though the two incidents shared strong similarities with 
respect to their root causes. 
Case History A 
High Cycle Fatigue Failure of Turbine Buckets 
The turbine in this case history was in service at a natural gas 
transmission pipeline compressor station. After many years of 
successful operation, the turbine was overhauled and operated for 
a further eight months, though at a reduced power setting. On being 
returned to full load, however, the unit failed after only a few 
hours. 
The failure was characterized by loss of airfoil material on all 
the first stage buckets down to 60 percent to 70 percent height 
(Figure 5). The last inch of the trailing edge tip was still intact in 
most cases. 
Figure 5. Failed First Stage Buckets. (The volume and shape of 
airfoil material loss was very similar on all the buckets in the row. ) 
The pertinent overhaul documentation was reviewed and it was 
found that the failed buckets had been a replacement set made up 
from three previously used groups of components. However, it 
appeared that refurbishment on these had been done with 
incomplete knowledge of the metallurgical reasons why the 
components had originally been retired. 
The metallurgical analysis revealed extensive, pre-existing 
oxidation/corrosion damage remained beneath the refurbished 
aluminide coating on the external side of the airfoil (Figure 6), 
while the original platinum modified aluminide coating was never 
actually removed from the inside surface. Heat treating the buckets 
in this condition had resulted in localized melting and excessive 
diffusion of the coating into the IN-738LC base metal. In thin­
walled components, this not only locally destabilizes the alloy 
microstructure, but also results in a thick, brittle layer on the 
internal surface. While acceptable creep rupture properties were 
obtained, the regenerative heat treatment cycles used did not fully 
restore the IN-738LC microstructure (Figure 7). 
Figure 6. Photomicrograph Illustrating the Damage to the Base 
Metal Below the External Coating on One of the First Stage 
Buckets. 
The set of buckets was also found to be made up of castings with 
two different airfoil styles. One of these had evidently been 
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Figure 7. Scanning Electron Micrograph of First Stage Bucket 
Alloy Illustrating That the Component Had Not Been Properly 
Heat Treated. (The microstructure consisted primarily of a single 
size gamma prime distribution with small isolated islands of the 
normal duplex gamma prime precipitate structure.) 
manufactured using a larger rear cavity core producing an 
approximately 25 percent thinner wall on the convex side of the 
airfoil. Radial cracks propagating down from the airfoil tip at the 
trailing edge of the rear internal cavity were present on these 
components. No such cracking existed on the buckets with the 
thicker walls. 
A mechanical analysis was performed using a three-dimensional 
finite element model of the bucket, and vibrational frequencies and 
mode shapes were calculated. The Campbell diagram showed that 
various resonant conditions were present in the operating range. 
However, high relative stresses were only evident in the crack 
locations when the bucket vibrated in Mode 9 (an axial bending 
mode). 
It was concluded that the cracks found in the tip regions of the 
thin-walled buckets had probably developed and grown slowly 
while the turbine was operating at lower power. The high power 
and speed condition excited the Mode 9 vibration and drove the 
cracks rapidly until a piece of airfoil on one of the buckets broke 
out (this particular bucket could not be positively identified). The 
other buckets then fractured readily when struck by debris in the 
ensuing impact cascade. The poor surface and microstructural 
condition of the buckets contributed to reduced fatigue strength 
and impact resistance. 
Discussion of the root cause of this incident is given later in 
conjunction with that of Case History B. 
Case History B 
Oxidation-Assisted Creep Failure of Turbine Buckets 
This turbine was in recompression service at a natural gas 
processing plant. Five days after restart following a plant outage, 
the unit experienced an automatic shutdown due to high exhaust 
temperature. There were no unusual prior operating conditions. 
Following one partial restart, the turbine failed to restart at all. At 
the time, the unit had accumulated around 26,000 fired hours since 
last being overhauled. 
When the turbine case was removed, it was discovered that 
airfoil material had been lost down to about 30 percent to 40 
percent height on all first stage (compressor turbine) rotating 
buckets (Figure 2). The volume and shape of material lost was 
similar on all buckets, though trailing edge sections were still intact 
on a few components. The other turbine section components 
sustained significant damage consistent with impacts with high­
energy debris. The "evenness" of the damage on the buckets 
somewhat resembled that which is typically observed when caused 
by a burning incident, but it was soon established that the failure 
was strictly mechanical in nature. 
It was clear that failure of the first stage buckets was the primary 
failure. The fractured surfaces were examined and the fracture 
mode was characterized as being of a brittle, intergranular nature. 
There was no evidence of high cycle fatigue. The examination was 
complicated, however, by the presence of many areas where the 
intergranular surface had been locally smeared producing a 
smoothed surface with striations that closely resembled the 
features usually associated with fatigue crack propagation. 
The pattern of damage on the first stage buckets was again 
consistent with a cascading (or "domino effect") impact overload 
mechanism initiated by the failure and breaking out of a section of 
the upper airfoil on one of the buckets. Fracturing of the airfoils 
would have occurred readily given the hollow design with walls 
thinning toward the tip, the relatively brittle characteristics of the 
service-exposed alloy, and prior cracking. The loss of a significant 
amount of airfoil material on all the rotating buckets caused a 
sudden reduction in the energy extraction (temperature drop) 
across the first stage, producing the high temperature excursion in 
the exhaust gas that tripped the turbine. 
Metallurgical analysis revealed that on around 10 out of the set 
of 80 buckets, extensive oxidation of the 1N-738LC alloy grain 
boundaries and axial cracking existed on the suction side surfaces 
behind the leading edge, just below the main fracture surface. The 
cracks extended almost completely across the airfoil section 
(Figure 8). These did not show up during a borescope inspection of 
the turbine just five days prior to the failure, though based on the 
oxide coverage of the fractured surfaces, the cracks had indeed 
been present and growing for some time. The material immediately 
below the cracks contained numerous secondary cracks running in 
parallel. Some of these were surface connected and oxidized, while 
others appeared unoxidized. 
Figure 8. Oxide-Covered Suiface of Mechanically-Opened Creep 
Crack in the Suction Side of a First Stage Bucket Around from 
Leading Edge. 
Measured creep rupture properties on material removed from the 
(lower operating temperature) root/shank sections of sample 
buckets, representing two of three different source/manufacturing 
lots making up the set, were significantly below the minimum 
standards for the alloy, indicating incorrect original heat treatment. 
The prior history of the parts, which were non-original equipment 
manufacturer (OEM) and purchased as used and refurbished, could 
not be located. However, there was evidence to suspect that some 
of the accumulated creep and oxidation damage had been sustained 
during a previous service exposure in a different turbine and was 
not properly repaired. 
Based on the degree of cracking present on some of the buckets, 
a premature failure appeared to be inevitable. However, it is 
thought that a slightly higher rotor operating speed after restart 
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from the unit outage, brought about by aggressive cleaning of the 
axial air compressor, subjected the bucket airfoils to an increased 
level of centrifugal stress sufficient to accelerate the growth to 
failure of an existing creep crack, after just a few additional days 
of operation. 
Replacement Parts Quality Issues 
In case histories A and B, the root cause of failure was traced to 
problems with the quality of refurbished used buckets installed as 
replacements at the previous major overhaul of the turbine. 
When refurbished used parts are being considered as a 
replacement set, it is important to have a knowledge (supported by 
appropriate documentation) of the prior operating and repair 
history of the parts. This would include: 
• Previous operating hours 
• Operation mode 
• Type and severity of damage sustained 
• Number of times repaired 
• Where repaired 
• Repair processes used 
Without such background information (and it can often be hard to 
fmd), the ability of the parts to perform reliably in the new service 
application cannot be properly judged. Moreover, sets of refurbished 
used components are sometimes made up from parts drawn from a 
number of different sources or manufacturing lots. This can increase 
the opportunities for wide variability in dimensional and material 
quality, and significantly complicate the task of properly verifying 
the acceptability of the full set. Clearly, it can take just one "bad" 
component to wreck an entire turbine section. 
Good judgement should be exercised or expert help sought in 
making repair or replacement decisions for critical turbine 
components (Natole, 1995). These decisions should not be based 
solely on price or delivery. The turbine user should prepare 
specifications to clearly define what is expected in terms of 
processing, critical dimensions, etc. The repair work should then be 
monitored in detail and the final quality verified before the set of 
parts is considered ready for installation in the turbine. This 
verification should take the form of destructive examination of a 
sample component (or components as necessary) for which alloy 
and coating microstructures and mechanical properties are analyzed. 
Unless the turbine user takes the above steps, risks may be taken 
on with respect to component integrity that are totally 
inappropriate for a turbine in a high reliability service application. 
Following the incidents in Cases A and B, the organizations 
involved undertook reviews of their procurement practices for 
critical hot section components. 
Case History C 
Accelerated Creep Failure of Turbine Buckets 
Caused by Previous Over Temperature Event 
This case history involved an earlier 9300 hp model of the gas 
turbine in cases A and B. The unit was used to drive a refrigeration 
compressor at a refinery. 
A catastrophic failure of the first stage turbine buckets occurred. 
All the bucket airfoils (which were of solid design) fractured at 
approximately mid-height (Figure 9), and impact damage was 
sustained by the downstream gas path components. 
The primary fracture on the buckets had propagated in an 
intergrannular mode across the entire airfoil section. The fracture 
surfaces at the leading edges appeared typical of high temperature 
creep or thermal-mechanical fatigue (Figure 10), while the 
remainder was more characteristic of intermediate temperature 
creep rupture crack growth and brittle impact overload. Evidently, 
one bucket airfoil had failed, initiating an impact cascade that 
resulted in the fracture of the other buckets in the row. 
Figure 9. Failed First Stage Bucket. (The upper photograph shows 
that the aluminide coating was missing below the fracture suiface 
and a secondary crack was present (highlighted by arrows). The 
mode of fracture was intergranular across the aiifoil section 
(lower photograph).) 
Figure I 0. Scanning Electron Fractograph of Failed First Stage 
Bucket Leading Edge. (The fracture had propagated in an 
intergranular mode.) 
The coating on the buckets had been lost in the leading edge 
region adjacent to the fracture surface, but the base metal was not 
oxidized. Microstructural damage and axially oriented cracks were 
observed at the leading edges on all buckets (Figure 1 1). No 
damage was present in the trailing edge regions, however. 
The estimated temperature of the bucket metal was only 1380.F 
at the nominal firing temperature of 1450.F. However, it was 
apparent that the buckets had experienced much higher 
temperatures at some point in their operating history. The over 
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Figure 11. Photomicrograph Showing Microstructural Damage 
and Cracking in the First Stage Bucket Leading Edge Region. (Left 
photograph, X40; right photograph, X100) 
temperature was evidently hot enough to cause the observed 
metallurgical damage (greater than 2 150'F) and melting of the 
coating/base metal diffusion zone (greater than 2 175'F to 2300'F). 
It was of insufficient duration to cause oxidation of the base metal, 
after the coating was lost, as well as bring about any similar 
changes in the airfoil further away from the leading edge region. 
The latter aspect was investigated via a simplified heat 
conduction/convective model of the bucket, demonstrating that the 
duration of the high temperature transient was likely no more than 
30 seconds. 
Given that enough refinery gas fuel could not be admitted to 
achieve the required temperatures at the base load condition, the 
most plausible cause of the short duration over-temperature 
condition was that burning liquids came through the combustor and 
impinged on the front of the rotating buckets. The locally elevated 
rates of heat transfer assisted in the raising of the metal 
temperatures to the levels necessary to produce the damage to the 
coating and alloy microstructure. The cracks found in the leading 
edge of numerous buckets likely initiated as a result of the 
metallurgical damage and reduced properties caused by the 
overtemperature exposure. The cracks subsequently progressed 
across the airfoil sections by the mechanism of creep until one of 
the buckets failed in overload. 
Based on the analysis, the turbine operator was prompted to 
review provisions in the fuel gas system for preventing flammable 
liquids reaching the turbine combustor. 
Case History D 
Overheating Failure of Cooled Turbine Vanes 
This case involved a 50 MW, geared, natural gas fired industrial 
gas turbine at a paper products facility. The unit provided electric 
power and a supply of hot gas for process purposes. 
. The tu
rbine came off a major overhaul and ran under uprated 
(mcreased firing temperature) conditions. After a number of 
months of operation, exhaust temperature spread and disk cavity 
temperatures were observed moving high. An outage was taken 
and it was discovered that all the first stage cooled nozzle vanes 
had sustained severe and irreparable overheating damage. The 
damage was concentrated on the suction side of the airfoil and 
significant breakthrough and breaking away of wall sections had 
occurred, Figure 12. 
As part of the failure analysis, a fault tree was created (Figure 4). 
Based on the condition of the combustor baskets, transition pieces, 
first stage rotating blades, and other evidence, it did not appear that 
the nozzles had been exposed to abnormally high gas temperatures. 
A cooling failure scenario was more probable, therefore. 
The vane airfoils were individually cooled by air diverted from 
the compressor discharge. The coolant entered each vane at the 
Figure 12. Row of First Stage Vanes Showing Burning Damage as 
Viewed from Trailing Edge Side. 
outer shroud into two full impingement cooling inserts. Spent 
impingement cooling air exited the vane through three rows of 
holes providing film cooling on the airfoil walls and a row of 
ejection slots along the trailing edge. Two of the rows of film 
cooling holes are located on the suction side of the airfoil, just 
around from the leading edge, and are designated S 1 and S2. The 
other row, P 1, was on the pressure side near the trailing edge. 
In examining the set of vanes, particular attention was given to 
those components that were among the least damaged and, 
therefore, could provide better opportunities for determining where 
the f�l�re originated. Several vanes were subsequently identified 
contammg features that appeared to be representative of different 
stages in the progression of the damage. From these, it was evident 
that local high temperature oxidation attack had started just 
downstream of the S 1 film cooling holes at the outer shroud end of 
the row (vane in Figure 13). The airfoil wall became breached and 
as the damage progressed along the row of holes, the cooling air 
�ow . became more . disrupted, exacerbating the overheating s1tuat10n and extending the area of damage. The vane cavity 
became exposed to the hot gases leading to the damage in the 
trailing edge region apparent in Figure 12. 
Figure 13. First Stage Vane Showing That Localized Oxidation 
Attack Had Commenced at Outer Shroud End of the First Row of 
Suction Side Film Cooling Holes. 
Powdery fines ingested by the engine compressor during the 
normal course of operation, and subsequently deposited on the 
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internal and external surface of the vanes, provided some useful 
data about how the cooling features had been performing. No 
evidence was found to suggest that any restricting or bypassing of 
the cooling air flow had been occurring. Streak-like markings 
extending over the thermal barrier coating on the external surface 
and corresponding to the trajectories of the air ejected from the 
film cooling holes (Figure 13) provided the most important clues. 
The patterns associated with the S2 and P 1  holes were consistently 
well defined and persistent in the downstream direction with little 
lateral interaction. The S 1  holes exhibited markedly different 
behavior, however. Surface trajectory patterns were not always 
present and, where they were, tended to be short and diffuse, 
suggesting that the mainstream gas had been getting around and 
under the cooling air jets causing these to become mixed-in 
rapidly. 
Based on the location of the damage, the observed cooling air 
flow patterns and results from simulations on a finite element 
based heat transfer model of the vane, it was concluded that 
aggressive oxidation attack had occurred. This was due to locally 
excessive metal surface temperatures that had been caused by the 
failure of the cooling air ejected from the S 1 row of holes to form 
a sufficiently persistent and protecting film over the airfoil 
surface immediately downstream. It appeared that this feature of 
the vane cooling design exhibited only marginal effectiveness 
under the uprated operating conditions. Among the contributing 
factors was that the S 1 holes were located in a high curvature part 
of the airfoil, resulting in the angle of the ejection holes being 
unusually steep. 
Another important aspect of the failure was that, while all vanes 
in the set sustained damage, there was significant variability in the 
degree of damage due to differences in the age and condition of the 
individual components at the beginning of the service period in 
question. In general, the damage on the older vane segments was 
significantly worse due to reduced safety margins on leading edge 
wall thicknesses (Figure 14). The uncoated internal and cooling 
hole surfaces had been oxidizing and reducing the ligaments 
between the holes, which also contained small thermal-mechanical 
fatigue cracks. 
Figure 14. Photomicrograph Showing Level of Pre-existing 
Oxidation Damage on Internal and External Suifaces of First 
Stage Vane Wall Section in the Vicinity of the First Row of Suction 
Side Film Cooling Holes. (Photograph, x60) 
Essentially, the weakened line of cooling holes acted as 
"perforations" along which the failure readily progressed. The 
inclusion in the vane set of components that had already 
accumulated 50,000 hours of service and been through four repair 
cycles was, in hindsight, probably not an appropriate strategy for a 
turbine about to be operated under even more demanding 
temperature conditions. 
Case History E 
High Cycle Fatigue Failure of Power Turbine Blade 
Due to Unanticipated Resonance Condition 
This case involved a 8500 hp rated, two-shaft, industrial gas 
turbine driving a seawater injection pump at an oil and gas 
production site. 
A last stage power turbine blade manufactured from Nimonic 90 
failed after about 24,000 hours of operation. The fracture occurred 
in the root section of the blade (Figure 15) and a number of other 
blades were identified as having cracks at the same location. 
Changing process requirements at the site had dictated that the 
driven equipment run at lower power and speed levels. The failure 
of the blade occurred after operation of the gas turbine under these 
new conditions. 
Figure 15. Failed Last Stage Power Turbine Blade. (The top fir tree 
serration crack and failure path along the second serration are 
seen. ) 
The blade root exhibited multiple fracture initiations on both 
first and second root serrations. The blade had failed across the 
second fir tree serration. Metallurgical examination of fracture 
surfaces and cracks revealed features consistent with high cycle 
fatigue. Fatigue striations were clearly visible and exhibited a 
repeating pattern at approximately eight-cycle intervals (Figure 
16). No material defects or other forms of degradation were found. 
While having found clear evidence identifying high cycle 
fatigue as the metallurgical mechanism of failure, additional 
information was necessary to help understand the cause. 
Accordingly, a mechanical analysis was undertaken to determine 
whether some feature of the design had predisposed the power 
turbine blade to fail in fatigue. 
A three-dimensional finite element model of the blade was 
created. The first six vibration frequencies and corresponding 
mode shapes were calculated for the model. The Campbell diagram 
presentation of the results is given in Figure 17, with the 
interferences of interest highlighted. A resonance existed in the 
first tangential bending mode at 10,200 rpm with the third 
harmonic of running speed. A different resonance existed in the 
second tangential bending mode at 9 100 rpm with the eighth 
harmonic, which corresponded to the number of combustors on the 
engine. It is likely that the first mode resonance initiated cracks in 
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Figure 16. Scanning Electron Fractograph of Cracked Last Stage 
Power Turbine Blade. 
the failed blade during short term operation transients to 10,300 
rpm, followed by propagation to failure under resonance 
conditions for much longer times at 9 100 rpm. The cracked blades 
probably initiated cracks due to the excitation during operation at 
the lower speed. The location of the calculated highest dynamic 
stresses correlated with the observed crack initiation points. 
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Figure 17. Campbell Diagram for Last Stage Power Turbine Blade. 
(The interferences of interest are highlighted. ) 
The freestanding design of the last row of power turbine blades 
was somewhat unusual for a variable speed machine in which it is 
often impossible to avoid some resonant conditions in the 
operating range. Lashing wires or interlocking tip shrouds are 
typically utilized to control blade vibrations. Prompted by the 
failure analysis described here and further occurrences on turbines 
at the same site and elsewhere, the turbine manufacturer 
acknowledged that a problem existed and undertook a complete 
redesign of the blade. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Fortunately, catastrophic failures of turbine hot sections are the 
exceptions, but our goal must be to reduce their number and 
severity. Because failures represent the experiences and response of 
the equipment to real world conditions, we cannot afford to ignore 
the valuable lessons and other information that can be extracted. 
Each failure is different. While there are a limited number of 
basic mechanisms by which gas turbine components can fail, the 
number of possible combinations of circumstances by which these 
mechanisms could be brought about is practically limitless. Even 
with seemingly identical failures on the same model of turbine, 
site, and user specific factors can have had crucial influences. 
Comparisons between particular occurrences can clearly be useful, 
but drawing conclusions based solely on outward similarities 
should be avoided. Each failure should be individually analyzed 
using proven methods to properly understand all the causal aspects 
and, from these, develop the specific corrective measures to avoid 
costly recurrences. 
APPENDIX A 
HOT SECTION COMPONENT 
DEGRADATION/FAILURE MECHANISMS 
Creep 
Creep occurs when hot section components are subject to high 
stresses at elevated temperatures for extended periods of time. The 
higher the stress-temperature combination, the shorter the 
component life. Current engine designs require the full creep 
strength properties of the blade alloy to operate reliably. If the 
properties are reduced due to extended operating times, incorrect 
heat treatments, or environmental attack, then component failure 
can occur well before the predicted life has been used up. 
Environmental Attack 
Turbine hot section components are subject to high temperature 
oxidation and high and low temperature types of hot corrosion by 
the combustion gases. Oxidation/corrosion resistant coatings are 
required on most hot section components, and the effectiveness of 
these coatings in protecting the base metal from environmental 
attack has, in many instances, become the principal life limiting 
factor. Environmental attack, by itself, seldom results in a 
catastrophic failure, but the damage caused to the components can 
eventually lead to their failure by some other mechanism. 
Thermal-Mechanical Fatigue 
Thermal-mechanical fatigue (TMF) damage is associated with 
high transient or steady-state temperature gradients in the 
component that results in differential thermal expansion of the 
material. When free expansion cannot occur as a result of the part 
geometry, high stresses and strains are generated. The highest 
strains usually occur in the hottest and coolest regions of the 
section. Thermal fatigue life is almost always surface related and is 
generally correlated with the number of startup and shutdown 
cycles. 
High Cycle Fatigue 
High cycle fatigue failures can occur as the result of the 
application of repeated or fluctuating stresses, typically associated 
with aerodynamic effects and machine vibration. In general, if the 
fluctuating forces are high enough or if the blade is excited at a 
resonant. frequency, cracks can develop and grow to failure very 
rapidly. Successful blade designs operate at stresses below those 
where fatigue cracks are caused. Abnormal conditions, such as 
large combustor temperature spreads and flow blockages or FOD 
in highly stressed areas, can raise the cyclic stresses enough to 
produce fatigue cracks. 
Foreign Object Damage 
Foreign object damage (FOD) occurs when objects in the gas 
path strike the rotating blades, usually causing dents, cracks or loss 
of material. The source for turbine FOD is from improperly 
secured hardware or failures that release pieces upstream, for 
example in the combustion system. 
Mixed Mode Failures 
It is often seen that more than one damage mechanism has 
contributed to a failure. For example, the "less damaging" 
ANALYSIS OF HOT SECTION FAILURES ON GAS TURBINES IN PROCESS PLANT SERVICE 19 
mechanisms, such as wear, FOD, erosion, or environmental attack, 
particularly where localized, can change the stress conditions in a 
component leading to cracking and subsequent failure by fatigue, 
creep, or overload. 
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